I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Airbnb came under fire when a Harvard Business School study showed that property owners were less likely to accept those with black-sounding names as renters and that non-black hosts were able to charge "approximately 12% more than black hosts, holding location, rental characteristics, and quality constant." 1 In the wake of public outcry, the company hired former Attorney General Eric Holder to help it devise a new antidiscrimination policy. 2 In an October 2016 working paper conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research, researchers looking at taxi-services Uber and Lyft showed that the cancellation rate for passengers with blacksounding names was more than twice as high as for those with whitesounding names. 3 In response to the study, Senator Al Franken wrote to both Uber's and Lyft's CEOs to ask why it was necessary to include passenger names and photos, and what Uber and Lyft could do to end discrimination and better enforce their self-imposed antidiscrimination policies. 4 
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[2017 necessary to create a "digital trust profile," they agreed to experiment with other ways to prevent discrimination. Franken, however, "remain [s] concerned" that the current systems "do not sufficiently guard against discriminatory conduct." 5 In both of these examples, we see a public quick to condemn and demand fixes for discrimination perpetuated by individuals against other individuals, though facilitated and arguably encouraged by the companies synonymous with the on-demand economy. We also see companies looking to mollify public outcry outside of litigation, with varying degrees of success. 6 As I've written about in the labor context, public pressure on high-profile and reputation-sensitive companies has long been used to garner gains for workers, even when those workers are not the employees of the targeted company. 7 And as we've also seen recently, the public is ready and willing to boycott companies to protest companies' policies and their leaders' political affiliations. 8 But eventually the question arises: what does the law say about these objected-to forms of discrimination? It is well and good if Airbnb and Uber voluntarily create and meaningfully enforce antidiscrimination policies, but are the types of discrimination the public objects to-discrimination engaged in by one individual against another within the commercial 6 That is not to say there have not been some lawsuits. In June 2016, Gregory Selden, the African American Airbnb user who first created the #airbnbwhileblack hashtag, sued Airbnb for race discrimination on behalf of himself and other African-American Airbnb users. He argued that Airbnb was liable under federal civil rights law as a public accommodation. However, the district court never reached the substantive claim, instead granting Airbnb's motion to compel arbitration consistent with the sphere-illegal, for the individuals discriminating or for the companies facilitating it? And if our current antidiscrimination laws fail to cover these objected-to forms of discrimination, should they? Can they? There are at least two ways the law might be used to address the types of individual-on-individual discrimination seen in the on-demand economy: such discrimination may be directly prohibited, as discrimination by an employer against an employee is, or such discrimination may be limited indirectly, through the enactment of laws that prohibit companies from facilitating it. Indirect means can shape consumers' decision architecture along a spectrum, from providing a nudge toward non-discrimination to making the ability to discriminate impossible altogether. The way antidiscrimination laws work in the home-seeking context provides one example of the nudging end of the spectrum. While today laws are not used to directly prohibit individuals from engaging in race discrimination when choosing where to live, laws directed at landlords, realtors, and developers prohibit these third-parties from facilitating home-seeker discrimination. This in turn raises the cost to home-seekers who try to discriminate. 9 Along these lines, in an effort to eliminate discrimination against individuals with black-sounding names, we can imagine laws that prohibit companies like Airbnb, Uber, and eBay from showing users' real names. Individual buyers and sellers may nevertheless find other ways to engage in discrimination-consciously or not-but with the higher costs of doing so, such laws should result in at least somewhat less discrimination.
There are likely pragmatic reasons to favor an indirect strategy of limiting individual-on-individual discrimination within the market. Companies are bigger, have deeper pockets, and some can be sensitive to reputational harms, which may combine to make enforcement easier. 10 In addition, targeting individuals directly may result in forms of backlash or resentment that could result in more discrimination and racial animus-negative effects that might be avoided though a more indirect approach. These are all legitimate concerns that, on their own, may lead us to favor indirect action. But there is a qualitatively different kind of concern that scholars and courts have intimated about direct prohibitions on discrimination by individuals-namely, that individuals have a constitutionally protected right to discriminate generally, which covers when they act in the market as consumers or sellers. For those who posit such a right, the direct regulation of individual discrimination seems off the table, or at minimum constitutionally problematic. But interestingly, at least some people who have this view think that the indirect regulation of individual discrimination avoids these issues. For instance, in their Article Discrimination by Customers, Katharine Bartlett and Mitu Gulati take the position that individuals qua consumers have autonomy and privacy rights that ought to block the enactment of direct prohibitions on their discrimination. 11 However, they think additional indirect restrictions on customer discrimination, via additional restrictions on the companies that facilitate it, are acceptable. 12 Similarly, Tarunabh Khaitan argues that antidiscrimination duties are not imposed on employees, tenants, and consumers because they have strong claims to negative liberty whereas employers, landlords, and sellers do not. 13 But while Khaitan concludes that individuals have negative liberty claims that make direct prohibitions on their discrimination problematic, he does not see antidiscrimination duties on sellers as also implicating those same individuals' interests. I have begun to worry about this position.
If individuals have a right to discriminate within the market, be they buyers or sellers, there is at least a prima facie case to be made that third-parties (like employers and sellers) will be able to challenge antidiscrimination laws targeted at them by invoking those individuals' rights. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com 14 highlights the problem of conjoining a consumer right to discriminate with prohibitions on third-parties who facilitate or encourage that discriminatory conduct. 15 There, Roommates.com challenged the constitutionality of a law that would prohibit it from facilitating its users' discrimination in the selection of housemates on the grounds that such a law would constitute a burden on the constitutional right of its users to engage in that discrimination. 16 The Ninth Circuit, invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, appears to have agreed with Roommates.com's argument. 17 Fennell also recognizes this issue within 11 Id. at 226. 12 Id. at 249. 13 fair housing law. As she explains, some criticize prohibitions on discriminatory collateral search behavior (the behavior of third-parties who might assist home-seekers in engaging in discrimination when finding and securing a property) on the grounds that such collateral behavior should be legal so long as the underlying discriminatory conduct of the home-seeker is. 18 In other words, within fair housing law, some argue that if the underlying discrimination of home-seekers is legal, it should be just as legal for third-parties to help them engage in it. 19 As a result, Fennell sees arguments that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits home-seekers from discriminating-regardless of whether § 1982 is enforced-as buttressing the direct liability for collateral search behavior created through the Fair Housing Act. 20 The problem of indirect restrictions on exercises of rights is not limited to antidiscrimination law. Consider the speech context. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 21 the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a law that prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors absent parental consent. 22 The Court found the law, which directly regulated only the activity of sellers, to violate the free speech rights of the buyers (i.e., the children). Scholars have also identified related First Amendment issues when state actors look to suppress individual speech by enlisting private actors like Facebook, Google, and ISPs. 23 There are many other cases where the Court has struck down restrictions on actor A on the grounds that those restrictions infringed on the constitutional rights of actor B. 24 In short, if individuals' ability to discriminate on the basis of race and sex while engaged in market activity is constitutionally protected, then the indirect laws favored by Bartlett and Gulati, and the explanation for why firms can be antidiscrimination duty-bearers while individuals cannot 18 See Fennell, supra note 9, at 395. 19 Given the above and the themes of this Symposium, my interest is in whether individuals qua market actors do or ought to have a right to discriminate on the basis of race or gender. As I hope the above shows, those concerned about the future of antidiscrimination law within the on-demand economy and beyond need to get clear on this. To that end, my goal in this Essay is modest. I simply want to lay down groundwork for thinking through whether, normatively or descriptively, there is an individual right to discriminate in the market. To that end, in Part I, I sketch some high-level considerations that those who want to assert or deny that individuals ought to have a right to discriminate in the market need to think through. In Part II, I look at how the law currently treats discrimination by individuals within the market and how that treatment speaks whether there is an individual right to engage in that conduct today.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Here I focus on two issues surrounding the legitimacy of government regulation of individual discrimination: (1) what makes the targeted forms of discrimination legitimate targets and (2) the significance of the market in that determination.
A. Government Legitimacy: Harm or Injustice
Liberalism is committed to there being principled limits to legitimate government authority. At the broadest level, liberals rely on either concepts of harm or of injustice to mark those limits.
Under what is known as the Millian Harm Principle, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized society, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." 25 Once the Harm Principle is triggered through the infliction of a third-party harm, legal regulations aimed at curbing that harmful act are legitimate and the regulated-actor has no liberty-based objection to those regulations as such. 26 25 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 12-13 (2015) (1859). 26 In other words, once there is a third-party harm, the end-preventing that harm-is legitimate. Under a Millian picture, your liberty is not violated when the state acts to prevent you from inflicting a third-party harm: your liberty interests end where third-party harms begin. One might object to the means the state uses to prevent the third-party harm but there is no liberty-based objection to the end-preventing third-party harm-itself. 
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John Rawls is associated with the alternative way of limiting the state's legitimate power. On this view, the state can legitimately act to ensure justice, including both corrective and distributive forms. 27 Because corrective justice looks a lot like remedies for harms, a simplified version might just say that liberals differ according to whether they think (1) the state can legitimately act to not only deal with harms but also distributive injustices and (2) if the answer to (1) is yes, whether, and if so how, the methods the government can use to respond to harms (i.e. the targets of corrective justice) and injustices (i.e. the targets of distributional justice) differ. 28 The above matters for whether the state can prohibit individuals from discriminating against each other, in the market and more generally. If we assume Bartlett, Gulati, and Khaitan are operating within a Millian framework when they say that prohibiting forms of consumer discrimination would violate those consumers' negative liberty interests, they have committed themselves to the position that consumer discrimination does not constitute a harm and thus government prohibitions on that discrimination would be illegitimate. 29 If one wants to resist this conclusion, one needs to (1) show that the relevant forms of discrimination do constitute harms or (2) reject the Millian framework, embrace the Rawlsian alternative, and then show that the relevant forms of discrimination result in distributional injustice, and thus the state can legitimately act to prevent or cure them.
At the same time and so long as we are committed to liberal theory, the account of why the relevant forms of individual discrimination can be legitimately regulated (be it on a Millian or Rawlsian framework) cannot be one that decimates the principled limits of legitimate government authority. 30 As I said at the outset, liberalism is committed to there being principled limits to legitimate government authority. Given this, it would likely be problematic to take the position that individual discrimination is harmful (and thus legitimately proscribed) because we 27 John Gardner discusses this in more detail. See John Gardner, Discrimination as Injustice, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 365 (1996) . 28 See John Gardner, Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1989). 29 For a more careful parsing of these arguments see Whitney, supra note 26. 30 A libertarian worry lurks here. See David E. Bernstein, Context Matters: A Better Libertarian Approach to Antidiscrimination Law, CATO UNBOUND (June 16, 2010), http://www.cato-un bound.org/2010/06/16/david-e-bernstein/context-matters-better-libertarian-approach-antidiscrimi nation-law [https://perma.cc/RR7U-5BEM] ("The proliferation of antidiscrimination laws explains why libertarians are loath to concede the principle that the government may ban private sector discrimination. There is no natural limit to the scope of antidiscrimination laws, because the concept of antidiscrimination is almost infinitely malleable."). Of course, the concept of harm is also susceptible to this criticism and yet libertarians (and liberal theory more generally) are committed to it as a legitimate doctrine. harm each other whenever we fail to treat each other "equally." In a liberal society individuals are permitted to act on their personal preferences and pursue their own projects in ways that will mean privileging some over others. If the state can require us to treat each other equally in all of our dealings, it looks like there is no space left at all for individual decision-making free of state control (i.e. we are no longer within a liberal state). 31 But this is all by way of warning-the literature on what makes various types of discrimination wrong is vast and an account can be given as to why the regulation of certain forms of discrimination by individuals, at least within certain contexts, is legitimate (i.e. the discrimination is either harmful or results in distributional injustice). 32 The point here is twofold: such an account must be given for each kind of discrimination we want to target and we must be careful to not give an account that does away with our background commitment to a limited state.
B. The Significance of the Market for Government Legitimacy 33
This Symposium is focused on changes to labor and work and so I have focused on whether individuals acting in the market have a right to discriminate. If they do, regulating the sorts of discrimination seen in the on-demand economy will be problematic and an increasing share of American workers may fall outside of the purview of our antidiscrimination laws. But while there are pragmatic reasons I have focused on discrimination within the market, there is a separate question of whether the market/non-market distinction is theoretically significant. One might think the market/non-market distinction tracks something significant with regards to the legitimacy of antidiscrimination law. Then again, one might think the opposite-that there is nothing special about the market and accordingly there is nothing special about discrimination that occurs there. In thinking through whether the state can legitimately prohibit discrimination by individuals within the market (my narrow focus in this Essay) we may need to know whether the 31 See Gardner, supra note 28, at 3. 32 fact that the discrimination is occurring within the market matters for purposes of that analysis. One inroad into the significance of the market/non-market distinction requires a bit of a historical detour. As discussed above, liberals are committed to there being limits to governmental authority. In the United States, we have come up with different frameworks with different limiting principles to mark these limits. During Reconstruction, both those opposed to and in favor of various antidiscrimination laws agreed to a tripartite theory of rights framework. 34 There were civil rights, political rights, and social rights. 35 Everybody basically agreed that while the government could legitimately act to ensure civil and political forms of equality, it was forbidden-that is, it would be illegitimate to-protect social equality. With this framework in place, the debate surrounding particular antidiscrimination laws centered on whether the laws were addressing civil, political, or social issues. 36 Those who objected to certain laws-like those prohibiting race discrimination in public accommodations-argued that such laws were trying to illegitimately "enforce social . . . equality." 37 Within this tripartite framework, the market as such was not a special category. Some market/economic rights were understood to fall squarely within the civil domain, like the capacity to hold property and enter contracts, while others that also dealt with commercial activity, like deciding with whom to associate when doing business, were thought by some to be social and thus beyond the government's legitimate reach. 38 When the Court finally did uphold extensions of antidiscrimination laws to housing and private contracting, 39 such cases were understood as "the triumph of civil rights." 40 That is, a triumph of getting the regulated activity to be understood as implicating civil and not social equality, and thus becoming legitimate targets of regulation. Over time the tripartite theory fell away but the underlying and substantive tensions surrounding the legitimacy of government regulation of private (i.e. non-government) discrimination continued. 41 In the language of modern liberal theory we can put the concern like this: how can we have a state with limited powers and a space free from government intervention while also increasingly regulating the choices nongovernment actors make in deciding with whom to associate and on what basis? With that same concern remaining, alternative frameworks came about for trying to mark the limits of legitimate government authority. More in use today is the public/private distinction, which is as contested and malleable as the tripartite theory before it. 42 Another closely-related distinction, and the one I focus on here, draws a circle around economic activity and finds it a legitimate target of regulation. We can call this a market/non-market distinction. While I cannot construct an entire history here, I see the idea that things taking place within the commercial domain can be treated differently for purpose of state regulation in, e.g., the historical treatment of commercial speech, 43 fair use analysis in copyright, 44 We have also seen the market/non-market distinction in antidiscrimination law. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 48 Justice O'Connor found "only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial associations" as "[t]he Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the State." 49 As Samuel Bagenstos explains, Justice O'Connor's position in Jaycees has been used to create an expressive-commercial distinction. 50 This distinction, in turn, has been used to limit the Court's ruling in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 51 where it held that an organization's First Amendment rights could trump the application of antidiscrimination laws. 52 However, like the tripartite theory of rights, the public/private distinction, efforts to cabin the harm principle, and construction of a negligence standard, the market/non-market distinction is an attempt to make sense of the limits of legitimate government authority in our lives and come to some kind of agreement about what we owe each other qua members of a community. These are not, I suspect, metaphysical kinds. As a result, the commercial-expressive and market/non-market distinctions, with government interference with activities categorized in the former thought legitimate in ways it would not be for activities in the latter, is susceptible to critique. 53 The Court's recent treatment of the commercial-expressive and market/non-market distinctions suggests its relationship to the distinctions is increasingly ambivalent. Lawrence is an example of the Court embracing the distinction, where it pointed out that the case involved sex that took place outside the market. 54 It is on this basis that lower courts have not found Lawrence to entail a constitutional right to prostitution. 55 In contrast, within the First Amendment domain the mar-48 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 49 Id. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 50 Bagenstos, supra note 34, at 1230. I see this as a close cousin to the market/non-market framework.
51 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 52 Id. at 640. The distinction works as a limit because the organization in question was not commercial. 53 Bagentos goes through some of these distinctions. 57 But putting aside the Court's actual treatment of the market/nonmarket framework, one might still think it the best heuristic available for making sense of the limits of government power. 58 The point I want to make is this: to think through whether the government can legitimately prohibit individuals from discriminating in the market, one needs to decide whether the "in the market" qualification matters. One might embrace the market/non-market distinction, tenuous as it is. Or one might reject it. The tripartite theory, too, has faded away. But at bottom I suspect we need some principled account of the legitimate limits of government regulation and how antidiscrimination laws square with them. 59 
III. A CONSUMER RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE UNDER CURRENT LAW
So far I have discussed two larger legitimacy concerns regarding the regulation of individual discrimination in the market. Below I engage the law on the ground. Specifically, I look at two statutes-Section 56 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1767 (2017) (("'Commercial speech is no exception,' to the principle that the First Amendment 'requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.'") (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)) (Kennedy, J., with whom Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J. joined, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). I also discuss this erosion elsewhere. See Whitney, supra note 33, at 28. 57 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, docket no. 16-111, cert. granted June 26, 2017. The question presented is whether Colorado's public accommodation law, which requires the petitioner to provide a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, unconstitutionally violates his free exercise or free speech rights under the First Amendment. 58 Some philosophers continue to defend the market/non-market distinction as a meaningful one. See, e.g., DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE (2010) 125 ETHICS 1053 125 ETHICS (2015 . 59 As an example of another approach, some have thought antidiscrimination duties can be legitimately targeted at entities that distribute primary social goods or are agents of distributive justice. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 27, at 363 (discussing employers as agents of distributive justice). While at first blush this seems to exclude the imposition of antidiscrimination duties on individuals, some have argued that individuals do distribute primary social goods-for instance, they argue that romantic relationships are primary social goods. Thus, the regulation of online dating sites is legitimate. 
A. Section 1981
The history of § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is long and I will not recount it all here. In broad strokes, one of the main abuses the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were aware of was not the abuse of large employers but of individual white land owners contracting with free blacks in ways that recreated the conditions of slavery. 60 The public/private or private/state action distinctions we find significant today were not of concern. 61 Instead, "a principle purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866" was to "grant to the Freedmen basic economic rights-to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be sued, and to purchase and lease property. These rights would enable them to act as autonomous, productive workers, who could hope to accumulate some material wealth." 62 While originally enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, there was uncertainty about whether § 1981 could reach private discrimination after it was reenacted under the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 67 The Court came to this conclusion in the face of school and parental claims that they had a constitutional right to discriminate in their associations. 68 Section 1981 became, after Runyon, "a powerful weapon against private racial discrimination in a wide variety of relationships which may be defined as contractual in nature." 69 Later, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 70 which endorsed the Court's interpretation of § 1981. 71 As "it currently reads, § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in all forms of contracting, no matter how minor or personal." 72 While the statute has been "unjustly neglected as a source of protection for civil rights," it remains on the books and suggests that we have historically upheld prohibitions on individual discrimination within the market. Like Fennell's reading of § 1982, § 1981's prohibition on race discrimination in contracting buttresses the legitimacy of laws that seek to limit consumer discrimination by prohibiting third-parties from facilitating or selling it. 73 
B. Title VII and the BFOQ Exception
Intentional discrimination in employment is illegal-usually. 74 Title VII prohibits, among other things, employers from intentionally discriminating against employees on the basis of race and sex. 75 But while that prohibition is absolute when it comes to disparate treatment on the basis of race, sex discrimination is permitted when sex qualifies as a bona fide occupational requirement ("BFOQ") "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 76 Given that the BFOQ exception does not include race, consumer racial preferences never legitimate a company's racially discriminatory policy. 79 As it looks and as § 1981 already suggests, there is simply no right to buy or sell race discrimination. Putting § 1981 aside and focusing solely on Title VII, there is no consumer right to engage in race discrimination that blocks laws that prohibit third-parties from selling racial discrimination to them. 80 Things are more complicated when it comes to consumer demand for sex or gender-based discrimination. Consumer sex-discrimination demands can be broken down into two categories: those concerning sexual titillation and those concerning privacy. 81 Courts treat these demands differently. When employers argue that consumers want to engage in sex-discrimination for privacy-based reasons, courts are much more willing to find sex a legitimate BFOQ than in cases where employers argue consumers want to engage in sex-discrimination for purposes There, invoking a sex-and-gender-blindness conception of Title VII, the Court interpreted the Act "to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions." Id. at 240 (Brennan, J., plurality) (emphasis added). 77 of sexual titillation. Indeed, while in the former case some courts have raised-though not fully explored or committed to there being-consumers' constitutional privacy rights at stake, the latter are resolved without any reference to consumer rights at all. Let's now turn to these two categories in more detail.
Sex discrimination for sexual titillation
In sexual titillation cases, "employers argue that they must discriminate on the basis of sex in hiring to provide customers with the type of sexual arousal their businesses promise." 82 Courts' treatment of these cases fall along a continuum: on one end are cases where employers are selling explicit sexual gratification (e.g., prostitution or lap dances) and particular types of bodies are thought necessary. 83 Here scholars assume courts would permit sex-based hiring as a BFOQ. 84 In the middle of the spectrum are cases involving the sale of sexual arousal through the exclusive sale of sexual gaze objects (e.g., strippers and centerfolds). 85 Here as well, courts and commentators have assumed sex a BFOQ. 86 On the other end of the spectrum are "plus-sex" businesses, which sell nonsexual goods bundled with sexual arousal through the provision of sexual gaze objects (e.g., flights plus sexy flight attendants, restaurants plus sexy servers). Here, courts almost invariably reject sex as a legitimate BFOQ, finding sex not "essential" to the business operation, with courts confidently deigning the essence of the business the non-sexy part. 87 82 Id. at 155-56. 83 Id. at 156. 84 Id. 85 Id. at 157. 86 Id. at 158. See also, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("[I]n jobs where sex or vicarious sexual recreation is the primary service provided, e.g. a social escort or topless dancer, the job automatically calls for one sex exclusively."). 87 Yuracko, supra note 74, at 158. Yuracko criticizes courts' attempt to determine the essence of these businesses. See id. Pan American and Southwest are often thought a paragon of this. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). There, the Fifth Circuit rejected Pan Am's BFOQ argument that it hired only female flight attendants because, in part, customers preferred female stewardesses for their skill in "non-mechanical aspects" of the job, such as "providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as possible within the limitations imposed by aircraft operations." Id. at 387. While the court acknowledged that woman flight attendants increased the pleasantness of the environment through their "obvious cosmetic effect," this was non-essential to the business, which was "provid[ing] safe transportation from one place to another." Id. at 388. See also Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. at 302 (holding that, even though Southwest explicitly advertised as the 'love airline' and on that basis hired only female flight attendants, sex was not a legitimate BFOQ because the company's primary function was to "transport passengers safely and quickly"). What do courts' treatment of employer BFOQ arguments premised on consumer demand for sex-discriminatory sexual titillation tells us about a consumer right to discriminate? First, when considering these BFOQ arguments courts do not view the ability (or inability) of individuals to buy sexual arousal (the sale of which is assumed to require sex discrimination in hiring) to impinge on buyers' constitutional rights. Take Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 88 where Southwest's BFOQ argument for hiring only attractive women flight attendants was rejected. 89 Southwest presented market data showing that customers wanted to buy air travel bundled with sexual gratification. 90 In rejecting the argument, the court never entertained the notion that consumers have a right to either buy sexual gratification specifically or engage in sex discrimination generally while in the market, such that employees' Title VII antidiscrimination rights and the correlative antidiscrimination duties on employers had to be shaped in light of them.
That courts see no constitutional issue with limiting the ability of consumers to buy sex discrimination for sexual titillation purposes-be it bundled with other goods or not-is in one way not surprising. In the United States, there is no general right to buy sex. Prostitution, the most obvious form of this, is prohibited in most jurisdictions. 91 Given this, one might take the position that if there's no right to buy sex-if the state can ban the sale of literal sex-then the state is also free to ban as much or as little of the sale of in-person sexual gratification or titillation as it deems necessary, and consumers have no rights-based objection to it. 92 A few thoughts about this. On the above view, the state's right to block the sale of in-person sexual gratification must be stronger than any individual's right to buy sex. The state's right to block the sale of in-person sexual gratification also must be stronger than any individual's right to buy sex discrimination. For both of these to be true, it seems necessary to subscribe to the market/non-market distinction and framework I discussed earlier. 93 Here's why: in striking down an antisodomy law, the Lawrence Court identified a substantive due process 88 517 F. Supp. 292 94 In order for bans on prostitution (and perhaps the sale of sexual titillation and gratification more generally) to be constitutional (or at minimum not subject to constitutional challenge), we have to think that the Lawrence liberty interest in choosing a sexual partner (a liberty interest in being free to discriminate on the basis of sex when having sex) is limited to the noncommercial sphere. Some reject the market/non-market framework, think there is nothing special about the market, and thus conclude that bans on prostitution are, post-Lawrence, unconstitutional. So far, this argument has been unsuccessful, 95 though given the Court continues to erode the market/non-market distinction, 96 it is conceivable that in the future the framework will be wholly rejected and Lawrence will be read to provide a right to have consensual sex with whomever we want for money. And if that happens, it seems to entail, at minimum, a right to engage in sex discrimination when choosing one's commercial sex partner (since that is what Lawrence was about).
It is an open question whether this newly-extended right also includes a right to engage in race discrimination for the same. 97 If it does, and erotic exceptionalism enters the market, it is possible that some will try to extend that right even further, to construct a general right to engage in sex and race discrimination within all commercial transactions. In short, the treatment of sex titillation BFOQ cases suggests, at minimum, that individuals have no right to buy in-person sexual gratification. It does not show that consumers have no right to engage in sex discrimination for things they can buy. If Lawrence results in the future protection of prostitution, then we seem to get a protected right to engage in sex, and possibly race, discrimination while in the market. Once introduced, Lawrence becomes a deregulatory device for those looking to limit and roll back antidiscrimination laws in the market. This is, borrowing from Bagentos, the unrelenting libertarian challenge to antidiscrimination law. 98 94 In contrast to the purchase of sexual titillation, employers are more able to engage in sex-discrimination when they argue that consumers' privacy interests would be offended or infringed if they did not. 99 As Yuracko describes, these cases also fall on a BFOQ privacy continuum, measured by degrees of physical and visual contact. 100 The strongest BFOQ claims involve jobs requiring either actual physical contact with or inspection of the consumer's naked body. 101 These claims are the most likely to succeed. 102 In the middle of the spectrum are jobs where employees see but do not touch consumers' bodies in various stages of undress. 103 In general, courts find customer interests in not being seen naked by members of the opposite sex sufficiently compelling as to justify sex-discriminatory employment practices. 104 The weakest privacy cases do not necessarily involve employees seeing or touching consumers' naked bodies but are thought to merely involve consumer or co-employee embarrassment or discomfort when performed by members of the opposite sex. 105 These claims are only sometimes successful. 106 99 See Yuracko, supra note 74, at 156 ("Courts have generally been quite permissive toward sex discrimination committed on behalf of customer privacy."). 100 Id. We might also add to the continuum the presence of children, since courts may be more likely to find same-sex hiring essential in those spaces. 101 In most privacy-based cases where courts find a legitimate BFOQ for sex discrimination, courts do not explain it by reference to a consumer constitutional right to privacy that would be infringed if the firm's BFOQ argument were denied. However, that is not always the case. In Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 107 a court did tie the privacy-based BFOQ exception for sex discrimination to a consumer privacy right. 108 Below, I briefly lay out Fesel and then turn to the complications around the consumer privacy-based right to engage in discrimination that it finds.
a. Fesel
In Fesel, a retirement home refused to hire a male nurse's aide because it claimed its women residents would not consent to having their "personal needs attended to by a male" and would in fact leave the facility if there were male nurse's aides. 109 As the court rightly saw, the women refused to be aided by male nurse's aides "undoubtedly" as a result of sex stereotyping. 110 This refusal was a form of "customer preference," which on its own could not justify a job qualification based on sex. 111 However, in upholding the home's BFOQ defense, the court understood this particular discriminatory preference as not just a discriminatory preference but a privacy interest protected by law. 112 As for the specific activities that implicated the relevant privacy interest, the court pointed to the intimacy of the personal care, which included bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes, and catheter care. 113 The court concluded that each of these functions "involves a personal touching as to which each guest is privileged by law to discriminate on any basis." 114 The court located the source of this legal privilege in tort and criminal law, though never pointed to any specific law. Instead, the court asserted generally that " [b] b. Complications around a consumer privacy-based right to engage in discrimination I take the Fesel court's thinking to be something like this: as both tort and criminal law show, individuals get to choose who touches them and they get to make that decision based on whatever they like. That is, when someone touches you without your consent, it does not matter (for purposes of criminal and tort law) if you refused consent because that person was a man, black, or simply wore shoes you found unpleasant-each person is "privileged by law to discriminate on any basis." 116 And from this the court concluded that since "the Home cannot legally force its female guests to accept personal care from males" without violating those guests' touching-related rights, the state cannot prohibit the home from hiring only female nurses. 117 Thus, a BFOQ exception is required.
While perhaps intuitively appealing on first pass, there are problems with the Fesel court's analysis. While it is true that the law of battery protects patients from unwanted physical contact, which a patient can demonstrate in the medical domain by showing (1) that she did not consent to either the touching that occurred or (2) that the touching was done by an unwanted medical provider, antidiscrimination laws do not raise this problem; the nurse's aide-whatever their sex, gender, and race-will only touch the guest once that guest has consented. 118 Crucially, "every legal right that patients have to privacy is rendered irrelevant by the fact that patients must consent to medical procedures." 119 Denying the Home's BFOQ defense only means that the Home is unable to guarantee its guests that the available aide will be a woman. If there are only male nurse's aides available, the individual guest can-indeed has a constitutionally protected right to-refuse that aid. 120 Given this, the privacy interest the court is worried about-the one connected to tort and criminal law-is in fact not in play at all. Regardless of whether 115 Id. 116 Second, the court's statement that the aid administered "involves a personal touching as to which each guest is privileged by law to discriminate on any basis" is false. 122 As Robert Post points out, "if the nursing home residents in Fesel had claimed a privacy right not to be touched by nurse's aides who were African American, their expectations would no doubt properly and ruthlessly be overridden by Title VII." 123 It is easy to see why, at first blush, a particular privacy right may seem imperiled by a particular antidiscrimination law. But, our firstpass intuitions are supposed to be the start and not the end of our inquiry. Upon careful attention to both the contours of the relevant interest and the mechanisms of the relevant law we can see, as the discussion of Fesel shows, that sometimes our intuitions are wrong; perceived conflicts can turn out to be illusory ones. 124 
c. Privacy rights and the legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws in the market
That consumer sex-discriminatory preferences couched in the language of privacy are often the most successful suggests that if consumers have a constitutional objection to Title VII's restrictions on employers' ability to sell them discrimination, the right derives from either the Fourth Amendment or the hazier constellation of constitutional sources from which other privacy rights derive. 125 A few brief thoughts on this. First, a consumer right undergirded by a vague idea of Fourth Amendment-based privacy rights may help explain why consumers' sex but not race discrimination is sometimes legitimated. In the Fourth Amendment context, courts still occasionally find the sex but not race of individuals relevant in determining whether a search is unreasonable. 126 For instance, in Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff 's Department, 127 the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc held that as a matter of law a strip search of a male prisoner by a female cadet was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 128 The Ninth Circuit underscored the "longstanding recognition that '[t]he desire to shield one's unclothed figure from [the] view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity.'" 129 Given this, the court found cross-sex strip searches especially degrading, humiliating, and in so being, unreasonable absent an emergency. 130 Although the Byrd court found the opposite-sex strip search to violate the inmate's Fourth Amendment rights, it is hard to imagine any court finding that inmates have a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of being strip-searched by someone of a different race. In 2017, we no longer recognize as reasonable-at least for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis-privacy-based arguments for racial segregation. 131 The complication here is that while sex-discriminatory preferences are sometimes part of a Fourth Amendment analysis, Fourth Amendment-based privacy interests are not obviously present in cases where firms are prohibited from satisfying the discriminatory preferences of consumers. BFOQ cases concern the privacy interests consumers have in relation to other non-government actors, where the Fourth Amendment does not typically apply. Instead, as the court in Fesel noted, to know our privacy rights vis-à-vis other non-state actors, we refer to tort and criminal laws. And in contrast to Fourth Amendment cases, where This Essay was motivated by a concern with this line of thinking. As I explained, if individuals do have a constitutional right to discriminate while in the market, these indirect methods may be much more problematic than these authors seem to think. Thus, it is my suggestion that we take a step back before going much further. Instead of taking as true the vague intuition that directly prohibiting consumer discrimination would violate those consumers' rights, we need to examine that intuition. 137 We need to understand whether the government can, in fact, legitimately prohibit individuals from discriminating in the market. Part of this inquiry requires a fleshed-out account of whether the regulated-discrimination is harmful or unjust. In trying to craft meaningful limits to the government's legitimate authority within liberal theory, we also need to decide whether a market/non-market distinction is a helpful one. I outlined my early thinking on these questions in Part II. A related question is whether, today, the law suggests individuals have a right to discriminate in the market. And, as in the case of privacy-based BFOQ cases, whether the arguments courts give to explain those rights are sound. Given both § 1981 and a closer inspection of the consumer sexual titillation and privacy interests raised in BFOQ cases, I find it unlikely that individuals have, today, a right to engage in race and sex discrimination while in the market.
